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### Our Man in the Kremlin


# *Secret Police, Spying Dominate Regime and All Agencies Abroad*

(Second in a Series)

By Frank Gibney

By mid-April, 1961, Greville Wynne, the British businessman in whom Col. Penkovsky confided, had taken Penkovsky's letter to British and American intelligence officers in London. In it, the Soviet General Staff officer described in detail his position in Moscow, together with his motives of volunteering to spy against the Soviet regime.

He promised to arrive in London later that month, in charge of a visiting Soviet delegation of technical and industrial experts. Many of these were in fact intelligence specialists from Penkovsky's own committee, the State Committee for Co-ordination of Scientific Research, which regulated all contacts and exchanges between foreign and



Soviet scientists and businessmen.

Penkovsky's own record and position were quickly checked out in London and Washington—and if Western intelligence had dreamed up the perfect man to penetrate the Kremlin's secrets, it could hardly have done better.

He was then 43 years old. Made a full colonel in the Soviet Army at 31, he had graduated both from the Frunze Military Academy (the Soviet Staff college) and the Military Diplomatic Academy.

—cover name for the three-year Soviet military intelligence school. He had served as assistant military attache in Turkey in 1956, run an area desk in Soviet intelligence headquarters and helped select and train intelligence officer candidates—one of the most sensitive jobs in the Soviet system.

The Colonel was also a veteran artilleryman who had taken the special Soviet Army course in military missilery at the Dzherzhinsky Artillery school. He was the former aide and still the confidant of Chief Marshal Varentsov, who commanded the Soviet tactical missile troops.

In almost every respect, Penkovsky was wired into the Soviet hierarchy. His great-uncle, Valentin Penkovsky, was a lieutenant general; his

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wife was a general's daughter. Penkovsky was on the friendliest of terms with his boss, Gen. Ivan Serov, Khrushchev's secret police expert, who now commanded Military Intelligence. Through Serov and Marshal Varentsov, he had pipelines to the highest levels of the Soviet regime and almost unlimited access to secret files and documents.

Other Soviet officers had defected to the West, over the years, but never anyone this high up in the Kremlin's operating command structure. In his own biography, he gave one big reason for his anger at the Soviet regime. Only a year or two before the State Security had discovered that Penkovsky's father had been a White officer in 1919—thus putting a sudden black mark on his record (and probably blocking his promotion to general).

As a professional soldier and General Staff officer, also, Penkovsky was increasingly appalled by the network of spies and informers he found throughout his own government—fully eight years after de-Stalinization had supposedly thawed Soviet society.

In the following excerpt from The Penkovsky Papers, he writes about the secret police dominance over the Soviet regime:

By Oleg Penkovsky

The Soviet government goes in force for espionage on such a gigantic scale that an outsider has difficulty in fully comprehending it. Daily we



**KEPT APART**—Col. Oleg V. Penkovsky, at left, is in dress uniform with medals. Gen. Valentin Penkovsky, Col. Penkovsky's great-uncle, deliberately kept away from him, fearing secret police discovery that Penkovsky's father fought the Reds in the Revolution.

expand our already swollen spy apparatus. That is what Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" and "struggle for peace" really mean. We are all spies.

Any Soviet citizen who has anything at all to do with the work of foreign countries or who is connected with foreigners in the course of his work, is perforce engaged in intelligence work. There is no institution in the U.S.S.R. that does not have in it an intelligence officer or agent.

Here are some of the Soviet ministers and committees through which we conduct intelligence: Intourist and the

International Book Association (almost 100 per cent State Security); Ministry of Foreign Trade; Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church; The Academy of Sciences; Union of the Red Cross; State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. . . . The list is almost endless.

State Security officers and agents are everywhere, literally everywhere. I saw fewer of them under Stalin than now. They control our whole Army and Military Intelligence, too. These Security police scoundrels even forced my aunt to be an informer. She worked for them the whole time she was a housekeeper in the Afghan and the Italian embassies in Moscow.

My poor aunt often came to my mother, crying and complaining about the degrading and dishonest things she had to do. She eavesdropped, stole documents, cleaned out waste baskets, wrote reports on diplomats, helped with provocations against them. Many times she complained to me. But this was before I began working for Military Intelligence. I could give her no advice, only sympathy.

Khrushchev himself directly supervises the work of the State Security. In this matter he trusts no one else; he controls the State Security as First Secretary of the Communist Party. It is said that Shelepin, the State Security boss, spends more time in Khrushchev's office than in his own headquarters on Dzerzhinsky Square. If it were not

for Khrushchev, Khrushchev could never have become the "supreme commander in chief."

#### Spies Abroad

The majority of the personnel in Soviet embassies abroad are Military Intelligence or State Security employees. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade exist as such only in Moscow. Abroad everything is controlled by us. Three out of four Soviet embassy officers are either from State Security or Military Intelligence. Thus, it can be stated without error that 50 per cent of Soviet embassy personnel are serving officers in intelligence. In Soviet consulates the figure is almost 100 per cent.

In an embassy the State Security spies on everyone, including us in Military Intelligence. Security police watch absolutely everything that goes on: the purchases people make, how they live and whether it accords with their salary, where they go, which doctors they visit, how much drinking they do, their morals. Meanwhile we in Military Intelligence watch the Security police in return. We want to establish which of our own men are connected with them or work as their informants.

A Soviet ambassador is first of all an employee of the Central Committee of the Party, only secondly of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Often he is himself part of the Military Intelligence or the State Security police. A great many of the Soviet ambassadors in foreign countries are intelligence officers.

Before my duty in the embassy in Turkey, I thought that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassies were important organizations with authority. Now I know there is only the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the two intelligence organizations.

To process people traveling abroad, there is a special Commission for Trips abroad under the Central Committee. It consists entirely of State Security officers. Any person, even a tourist, going overseas comes for a conference to the Central Committee.

When I was leaving, this scoundrel Daluda from the State Security poked through my file for two hours. What was he looking for? He questioned me about all my relatives, living and dead, about

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**PENKOVSKY'S BOSS**—Gen. Ivan A. Serov, secret police chief who purged Hungarian revolutionaries in 1956, was Penkovsky's boss in military intelligence headquarters and authorized his trips to the West.

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drink, quarrel with my wife, etc. He also asked me about international problems. This was done to me, an officer of the General Staff and the Military Intelligence!

#### Indiscriminate Espionage

We are engaged in espionage against every country in the world. And this includes our friends, the countries of the Peoples Democracies. Who knows, some fine day they may become our enemies. Look what happened with China. Months before the break with China became clear, instructions came direct from the Central Committee to begin intensive intelligence activity against China. Quietly, the Chinese section was transferred from the Directorate dealing with Peoples Democracies to that for neutral or enemy countries in the Far East.

Col. Pavel Demetriyevich Yezin was formerly the State Security resident in Turkey.

where I knew him. Later he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general and appointed pro-rector of the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow.

The entire faculty of this Lumumba Friendship University is made up of State Security police—even the people in charge of dormitories! Only a few professors are there as "co-optees," i.e. people who have agreed to work with the State Security. The basic task of the Friendship University is to prepare a fifth column for the African countries.

Many of the African students there have already been recruited. They are now working for the Soviet intelligence. They are studying Marxism and Leninism, preparing to become the future leaders of the African countries.

As a first step, after their return from Moscow, they are directed to organize strikes, demonstrations to overthrow

the time they live better than the average Soviet student. Almost everything is paid for.

#### Spies in Washington

The Soviet strategic intelligence service alone has special "residencies" (i.e. self-contained operative units) on the territory of the United States. One is in Washington, D.C.—"residency" personnel include individual Soviet Embassy secretaries, commercial representatives, and other employees.

There are two "residencies" in New York, one under the cover of the U.N. (The other, the "illegal residency," has direct independent contact with Moscow.)

The Washington "residency" has a great many Soviet operations officers and an insignificant number of agents; these are basically "old-timers" who were recruited a long time ago.

The New York "residencies" are of greater strength. They have new agents from whose ranks they build up the "illegal desidency." Among the agents are many foreigners who reside and work in the United States.

Intelligence officers of legal "residencies" (i.e. officers who have legally entered the U.S. with an official "cover" position) always use their cover, such as: Tass correspondent, Aeroflot representative, Merchant Marine, member of a trade mission.

Sometimes, in order to evade FBI surveillance, Soviet intelligence officers stay in the embassy overnight, sleeping on desks, then get up early in the morning to leave the embassy unnoticed. In this way, they manage sometimes to avoid surveillance.

After the Powers affair (the U-2 incident of May, 1960) Khrushchev issued an order to all units of the intelligence service, especially those in the United States, to cease their active work temporarily—in order to take no chance of putting into enemy hands any evidence pointing to Soviet espionage against the U.S. and other countries. In November, 1960, this order was rescinded. Intelligence activities began again in full swing. Recent directives have ordered establishment of social contacts with as many Americans as possible.

Ivan Yakovkavich Melekh is a Soviet Intelligence officer with the military rank of lieutenant colonel. He knows

he was an instructor of English at the Military Diplomatic Academy, which trains officers for Military Intelligence. After special training, Melekh was sent under the cover of the United Nations secretariat in New York to carry out his intelligence missions. That was in 1955. On October 27, 1960, he was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on charges of espionage. In April, 1961, the U.S. government dropped its charges on condition that Melekh leave the U.S. before April 17. This should help us to judge the value of Soviet protests and declarations at the U.N.

#### Friend of Servo

The present Chief of Military Intelligence, Gen. Alexander I. Serov, is not the most brilliant of men. He knows how to interrogate people, imprison them and shoot them. In sophisticated intelligence matters, he is not so skilled. Serov was a Beria man. Beria took a liking to him and pushed him to the top quickly.

Before coming to Military Intelligence, Serov was chairman of the State Security. After his appointment to Military Intelligence, he remembered my name from my Turkish assignment and became personally interested in my work. Eventually a certain degree of friendship developed between us and I visited him several times at his apartment and his country house. My personal relationship with Serov placed me in the forefront of Military Intelligence officers.

Serov lives on Granovskiy Street. Many ministers, members of the Central Committee and marshals live there. Rudenko, the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., lives on the same floor as Serov. When Serov was Chairman of the State Security, he arrested people and Rudenko signed the death sentence. One would drop into the other's place in the evening for a drink and they together would decide who should be put in jail and who should be shot. Very convenient.

Condensed from the forthcoming book, "The Penkovsky Papers," © 1965, Doubleday & Co., Inc.

**TUESDAY:** Col. Penkovsky's secret meetings with U.S. and British officers in London; he tells the true story behind the Soviet missile and space effort, and Khrushchev's threats to bury the West under the "ice of missiles."

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